3.3.2 |
CONCEPTUAL AND EVALUATIVE MEANINGS |
A phrase can be used to express or evoke a state of mind
which is cognitive, and it can be used to express or evoke a
state of mind which is affective or conative. In the former case
it is the conceptual meaning of the phrase which counts, in
the latter the evaluative meaning. These different
'pragmatic aspects of language' are related to the different purposes
for which such a system of symbols is applied. Words are
used on the one hand 'to record, clarify and communicate'
(cognitive) thoughts, whereas they are used on the other hand to
show or create feelings, or to incite people to act in a certain
way. The first kind of use has been termed "descriptive", the
second "dynamic".
The evaluative meaning of a word or phrase may be emotive or
normative. It is 'emotive' on our terminology if, and insofar
as, it is used to express a personal feeling, say, the feeling
that something is beautiful or ugly, pleasant or unpleasant. It
is 'normative' if, and insofar as, it is used to express the
conviction that something is right or wrong, or good or bad in a
normative sense. Emotive meaning is a kind of factual meaning.
Beauty and ugliness, and all forms of pleasantness and
unpleasantness, are facts, albeit relational facts with
respect to one particular being that experiences something as pleasant,
unpleasant, and so on. To say that something is nice or
unpleasant does not describe the thing in itself, however, and
therefore the use of words for this purpose is not descriptive
(of the thing in question). Similarly, to say that something is
right or bad (in a normative sense) does not describe the thing
or action itself either, and therefore also the use of words for
this purpose is not descriptive.
The concepts of denotation and connotation refer
practically to the same distinction as that between conceptual or
descriptive and evaluative or emotive meaning. The connotation is, then,
what is implied apart from what is explicitly named or described.
It is the subsidiary meaning of a word of which the conceptual
or descriptive meaning is of primary significance. It
may also be the case
tho, that only the
emotive or evaluative meaning of a word or phrase is important, and that
it has no, or only a vague, conceptual meaning. In that case the term
connotation does not properly express the essentially
evaluative nature of the word or phrase concerned.
The distinction between conceptual and evaluative meaning is also present
where it is said that linguistic symbols are not only related to concepts
in a narrow sense but to so-called 'stereotypes' as well.
These 'stereotypes' then underly the emotive meanings of terms.
The evaluative meaning of a word (or phrase) may be negative,
indifferent or positive. If it is positive, the word is
meliorative (or 'laudatory'); if negative, pejorative
(or 'derogatory'). A word may have the same unneutral evaluative
meaning in the whole linguistic community, it may also have a
meliorative meaning for some people and a pejorative one for
others, while having the same conceptual meaning. Altogether
there are the following possibilities with respect to differences
in usage between two groups or communities that in general
speak the same language:
- the phrase itself is only used by one group, not by the other (for
example, the name of a religious institution or
practise);
- the phrase is used by both groups but the conceptual meanings
are not the same, nor are the evaluative meanings (for example, the
word religionist and perhaps ideological);
- the conceptual meanings are the same but the evaluative
meanings are different (for example, revolution and perhaps
God and the Party);
- the conceptual meanings are not the same but the evaluative
meaning is (for example, freedom and democratic).
The evaluative meanings of a word can diverge widely, even
when the word has no or hardly any established conceptual meaning.
Thus the word god has a strong meliorative meaning for
theists and a strong pejorative meaning for antitheists (and a
nonmeliorative evaluative meaning for nontheists in general). There
is no universal evaluative meaning of this word in the present
language so long as there are enough speakers of this language
who worship one or more gods besides speakers who do not. It is
only because the word god did arouse in their time an
extremely deep, positive feeling in most, or the most powerful,
speakers that certain thinkers in the past decided to dignify
the principal being of their world-view by the then-laudatory
title god (or God), even tho that being did not look
like the or a 'god' of their contemporaries in any way. This is
a question of 'persuasive definition': use a familiar term
without changing its evaluative meaning; give it an entirely new
conceptual meaning, and thus alter the direction of people's
interests — hopefully that is. When the word god has
acquired a strong negative evaluative meaning in later times,
unsuitable for any meliorative persuasive definition, it is in the
first place because of its association with the contents and
historical records of what have been the dominant forms of
theism. It may technically be possible to give the term god
any descriptive or conceptual meaning one likes, but those
who reject all irrational
supernaturalism
that violates the principle of
truth and all discriminatory
exclusivism that
violates the principle of
relevance are not capable anymore
of using the term melioratively in an ideological context.
And therefore we shall not apply the name god (with or without
capital) to anything we value, even not — or rather, certainly not
— to a principal being, and least of all to (the) supreme being.
(In a
religionist society this may
require some courage, because there one risks the wrath, not of any
omnipotent god, but of the sometimes not much less omnipotent barons of
the worshipbuilding industry.)
Words such as good, right, nice and pleasant,
which are used to express a positive evaluation or emotion itself, are
typically meliorative, whereas words such as bad, wrong,
awful and unpleasant are typically pejorative. Such words
may have an evaluative meaning, they have no fixed descriptive
meaning at all. A term such as just or justice belongs to
the former category too. While it can conceptually be defined in
many different ways (like the word god), it has been pointed
out that it is not trivial which definition is chosen, since 'to
choose a meaning is to take sides in a social struggle', because
of the universal meliorative nature of just and justice
in the present language (unlike the word god). 'Everyone' is
in favor of justice, and this is why the term justice has a
'universal' meliorative meaning. And 'everyone' is against injustice,
and this is why the word injustice has a pejorative
meaning, even if there is no unanimity whatsoever with regard to
its conceptual content. Justice has a built-in rightness or
goodness, and injustice a built-in wrongness or badness.
When words have an inherent negative evaluation (like injustice)
they do not merely describe, if they describe at all.
To say that acts or situations denoted by these words are bad or
wrong is an analytical statement which does not convey any
substantive, normative or other evaluative information
independent of the time that and the place where the proposition
is uttered. Thus, in the present language taking something is
only called "stealing" when it is wrong, or judged to be wrong,
and therefore stealing is wrong (and also you should not
steal) is an analytical truth. Similarly, killing someone is
only called "murder", and telling something that is not true
"lying", when it is wrong, or judged to be wrong, and therefore
murder is wrong (or you should not murder) and lying
is wrong (or you should not lie) are analytical truths as
well. To say, for example, that you are against stealing, or that one
ought not to steal, is empty rhetoric. If it serves any sensible purpose
at all, such a statement can only serve another purpose than the direct
transmission of substantive information. What it may tell us at
the most is that there are ways of taking something which are
wrong and ways which are not wrong. But this is a truism. What
would be interesting to know is what criterions to apply to
distinguish the wrong ways of taking and having from the right
ways of taking and having.
A speech community is not a monolithic herd of people who
use all words in the same way and with the same feelings. (At
most a community of linguists could be such a herd.) For
example, the word suicide may have a definite negative
connotation for some and not for others. This may be a question
of a different moral outlook, but also a question of a different
linguistic usage. Those who do not condemn self-killing (in
general) as a form of killing or self-killing, just cannot use
the word suicide, if it has a negative connotation for
themselves or for the group they relate to. Similarly, those who
do not condemn erotic contact between (adult) (close) relatives
as a form of erotic contact, just cannot use the word incest,
if it has a negative connotation for themselves or for the group they
deal with. (As the original meaning of incest is impure
it is not surprising that the word incest has a negative
connotation.) If a term such as suicide does indeed carry a
pejorative load in the language used, people will start calling
certain acts of (intentional) self-killing "sacrificial" instead of
"suicidal". Self-killing is , then, 'sacrificial' (or heroic),
if it is (believed to be) good, right, justifiable or excusable,
and 'suicidal' if it is (believed to be) bad, wrong, not
justifiable or not excusable.
However, these differences in terminology have no bearing on substantive
normative issues, for the question remains whether self-killing, or for that matter, erotic contact
between relatives, is ever wrong, and if so, why.
And the same applies to all other forms of killing and intimate physical
contact.
A person who does not morally condemn certain acts of taking would not
call them "stealing"; and
'e would not call certain acts of
telling a falsehood "lying"; and not certain acts of killing "murder";
and not certain sexual acts "perversion".
All these words have a negative emotive and normative meaning.
It only makes sense to say that a particular act described by means of
a phrase with a clear conceptual and no definite normative meaning
is right or wrong, or neither right nor wrong. The revelation
that 'everyone' or 'all reasonable people' (or 'everyone who has
no perverted mind') agree that murder, theft, lying, incest,
perversion, injustice, and suchlike, are wrong is an intuitionist
platitude. Those who start from such statements lack any
insight into the functioning of language and the pragmatic
aspects of the diverse meanings of its constituents. Those who
finish with such statements express a type of moral thought
which is too shallow to allow for any worthwhile perspective on
normative affairs.