3.3.3 |
THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEUTRALISM |
Even if there were no people in the whole universe (not
in the past, not in the present and not in the future),
neutrality proper would still be
superior to
polarity. The
attraction between material bodies, the attraction between
particles with an opposite electrical charge, the quest for
equilibrium and, in general, for order and harmony in nature,
would still be
nanaic forces. It is only persons tho who
can recognize the neutralness of states of being, or the nanaic
nature of changes, as values. To embrace neutrality and nanaicity
as values is to accept a world-view in which the material and
the nonmaterial, the natural and the nonnatural, and the
personal and the nonpersonal are meaningfully related. Such a
world-view is not just an ethical one dealing exclusively with
people and the effects or right-making characteristics of
people's actions (or even worse: 'human actions'). It is a
total world-view which also comprehends the nonpersonal (and
nonhuman), the natural and the material. And because the one
principle underlying this weltanschauung is a normative one, it
is a denominational weltanschauung. (Evidently denominational
is then not used in the traditional way to refer to some kind of
religious organization. As a matter of fact something denominational
need in our modern sense not be connected with any social
organization.)
From the perspective of our denominational doctrine the
question is not What should material or natural bodies do, or
not do? but What should people do, or not do, who recognize
neutrality and nanaicity?. To answer this question let us start
with what cannot be contested by any manner of means. It is that
the least the norm of neutrality requires from people is that
they shall never choose an unneutral, ultimate or perfective
end. Some ends are not
catenical (like speaking the truth
and not speaking the truth) and therefore neither neutral nor
unneutral; some ends are unneutral but will serve neutrality in
the end. This is acceptable. What is not accceptable is that
something unneutral like inequality, change, happiness, unhappiness,
honor or dishonor is subscribed to as an ultimate or
perfective value in itself. To do this will probably lead to
more or greater unneutrality in the world, but even if it does
not (on the purely performatory level), the attitude of the
person concerned is
anti-anafactive or 'vicious' in
traditional terms.
The very minimum requirement of neutralism is the proscription of
anti-anafaction. This proscriptive or restrictive
side of our denominational doctrine can be labeled "the nonactivating
idea of neutralism". It is nonactivating because
it does not require a person to do something, but to abstain
from doing something. The intrinsic duty involved is thus a
nonactivating one.
(Consequentialists often argue that
there is no moral difference between an act and an omission, but
--even apart from nonconsequentialist considerations-- their
argument presupposes that a certain value like utility has
already been chosen as a goal. They then claim that nonaction is
as bad as action when it has the same consequences with respect
to that goal. Our point is here, however, the choice or
non-choice of goal itself, an issue which precedes any talk
about consequences or effects.)
Whereas the norm of neutrality does not imply more than a
prohibition of anti-anafaction on the nonactivating side, on
"the activating idea of neutralism" it implies more, namely the
prescription of anafaction. In activating neutralism one has the
intrinsic duty to choose neutrality as ultimate goal of one's
actions, and one must exert all
nanapolar strength possible to
fight polarity. In nonactivating neutralism anti-anafactiveness
is a decision-theoretical disvalue which should not be embraced,
whereas in activating neutralism anafactiveness is a value which
should be embraced. Nonactivating neutralism requires no energy;
it only requires that one not use one's energy for the wrong
purpose. This side of neutralism need therefore not be problematic.
On the other hand, activating neutralism requires energy,
energy which should be used for the right purpose. Here problems
can arise much easier, because, firstly, one has to choose a
specific objective; and secondly, one has to make sure that
one's action does indeed promote the cause selected. Moreover,
in the ground-world the pursuance of one anafactive duty may for
empirical reasons conflict with the pursuance of another anafactive
duty. An argument which cannot be put forward tho, is
that activating neutralism itself prescribes polarity and would
therefore be inconsistent. Activating neutralisn does indeed
prescribe polarity but of a kind which is not ananormatively
inferior. Hence, it is fully compatible with the superiority of
ananormative neutrality. It is something else that an activity
which is nanaic in one respect, can be unnanaic in another
respect for empirical reasons. Nevertheless, such an activity
should always be nanaic on the whole, or more nanaic than
unnanaic. In
the last chapter of this book we will discuss
what role
the principle of catenated neutrality can play in
the deliberation about such kinds of conflict.
Neutralism in general does not unconditionally require action,
even not nanaic or anafactive action. Only if people
act, should they ultimately aim at neutrality, insofar as the
catenical aspects of their actions are concerned. Activating
neutralism can require action, but only action from a person as a
person. The reason is that a person has a body, but that
'e is no body.
Therefore, the requirement of anafactiveness is
solely applicable to personal whole-predicates and to what was,
is or will be created, maintained and destroyed by people.
This does include the material, natural and nonpersonal too, but
merely if, and to the extent that, it was, is or will be
affected by people with anti-anafactive intentions, or whose
actions have or did have unnanaic effects on balance. Where it
is necessary to restore an equilibrium, or to create a harmony
which never existed before, this will indeed also involve
people's own bodies and other purely material things. Yet,
unlike neutrality and nanaicity, anafaction does not concern
matter as matter. In the strict sense the neutrality of the
norm of neutrality denotes for persons only the neutralities of
aspects with respect to which persons are catenal (not their
bodies or other nonpersonal primary things). The material and
natural world has its own nanaic forces, and people as people
are no part of it. It is only when they have transgressed
against neutrality or nanaicity in their bodies, or in other
material things, with the intention to do so (or with the
knowledge that they did so and could prevent it) that they will
have to restore their bodily or material neutrality, or that
they will have to take nanaic action with regard to these
material bodies.
In itself there is nothing 'wrong' in the sense of anti-anafactive
with moving about, for instance, as a result of bodily
needs, or as a result of an anafactive operation. What would be
wrong is that movement, or the highest speed possible, became a
goal in itself of the person concerned. The movement or speed of
the body is then the result of a person choosing an unneutral
ultimate goal. We all know that bodies, whether in a neutral
state or not, do not choose unneutral goals.
Similarly, in itself it is neither anafactive nor anti-anafactive
to fall in love with somebody, or to be disgusted by
somebody, at least if, and insofar as, this attraction or this
repulsion are purely given and not the result of anti-anafactive
considerations or practises. As a decision-maker a person does
not decide to fall in love or to be disgusted; these are things
which happen to
'im. Also
'er body does not decide
to be attracted or to be repelled. What is, or would be, anti-anafactive
for a person as a decision-maker is to choose love
or hatred as ultimate ends per se, or to have other people's
well-being depend on 'er own partial feelings of liking and
disliking.
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