TRINPsite, 56.35.6-56.35.6 



Even if there were no people in the whole universe (not in the past, not in the present and not in the future), neutrality proper would still be superior to polarity. The attraction between material bodies, the attraction between particles with an opposite electrical charge, the quest for equilibrium and, in general, for order and harmony in nature, would still be nanaic forces. It is only persons tho who can recognize the neutralness of states of being, or the nanaic nature of changes, as values. To embrace neutrality and nanaicity as values is to accept a world-view in which the material and the nonmaterial, the natural and the nonnatural, and the personal and the nonpersonal are meaningfully related. Such a world-view is not just an ethical one dealing exclusively with people and the effects or right-making characteristics of people's actions (or even worse: 'human actions'). It is a total world-view which also comprehends the nonpersonal (and nonhuman), the natural and the material. And because the one principle underlying this weltanschauung is a normative one, it is a denominational weltanschauung. (Evidently denominational is then not used in the traditional way to refer to some kind of religious organization. As a matter of fact something denominational need in our modern sense not be connected with any social organization.)

From the perspective of our denominational doctrine the question is not What should material or natural bodies do, or not do? but What should people do, or not do, who recognize neutrality and nanaicity?. To answer this question let us start with what cannot be contested by any manner of means. It is that the least the norm of neutrality requires from people is that they shall never choose an unneutral, ultimate or perfective end. Some ends are not catenical (like speaking the truth and not speaking the truth) and therefore neither neutral nor unneutral; some ends are unneutral but will serve neutrality in the end. This is acceptable. What is not accceptable is that something unneutral like inequality, change, happiness, unhappiness, honor or dishonor is subscribed to as an ultimate or perfective value in itself. To do this will probably lead to more or greater unneutrality in the world, but even if it does not (on the purely performatory level), the attitude of the person concerned is anti-anafactive or 'vicious' in traditional terms.

The very minimum requirement of neutralism is the proscription of anti-anafaction. This proscriptive or restrictive side of our denominational doctrine can be labeled "the nonactivating idea of neutralism". It is nonactivating because it does not require a person to do something, but to abstain from doing something. The intrinsic duty involved is thus a nonactivating one. (Consequentialists often argue that there is no moral difference between an act and an omission, but --even apart from nonconsequentialist considerations-- their argument presupposes that a certain value like utility has already been chosen as a goal. They then claim that nonaction is as bad as action when it has the same consequences with respect to that goal. Our point is here, however, the choice or non-choice of goal itself, an issue which precedes any talk about consequences or effects.)

Whereas the norm of neutrality does not imply more than a prohibition of anti-anafaction on the nonactivating side, on "the activating idea of neutralism" it implies more, namely the prescription of anafaction. In activating neutralism one has the intrinsic duty to choose neutrality as ultimate goal of one's actions, and one must exert all nanapolar strength possible to fight polarity. In nonactivating neutralism anti-anafactiveness is a decision-theoretical disvalue which should not be embraced, whereas in activating neutralism anafactiveness is a value which should be embraced. Nonactivating neutralism requires no energy; it only requires that one not use one's energy for the wrong purpose. This side of neutralism need therefore not be problematic. On the other hand, activating neutralism requires energy, energy which should be used for the right purpose. Here problems can arise much easier, because, firstly, one has to choose a specific objective; and secondly, one has to make sure that one's action does indeed promote the cause selected. Moreover, in the ground-world the pursuance of one anafactive duty may for empirical reasons conflict with the pursuance of another anafactive duty. An argument which cannot be put forward tho, is that activating neutralism itself prescribes polarity and would therefore be inconsistent. Activating neutralisn does indeed prescribe polarity but of a kind which is not ananormatively inferior. Hence, it is fully compatible with the superiority of ananormative neutrality. It is something else that an activity which is nanaic in one respect, can be unnanaic in another respect for empirical reasons. Nevertheless, such an activity should always be nanaic on the whole, or more nanaic than unnanaic. In the last chapter of this book we will discuss what role the principle of catenated neutrality can play in the deliberation about such kinds of conflict.

Neutralism in general does not unconditionally require action, even not nanaic or anafactive action. Only if people act, should they ultimately aim at neutrality, insofar as the catenical aspects of their actions are concerned. Activating neutralism can require action, but only action from a person as a person. The reason is that a person has a body, but that 'e is no body. Therefore, the requirement of anafactiveness is solely applicable to personal whole-predicates and to what was, is or will be created, maintained and destroyed by people. This does include the material, natural and nonpersonal too, but merely if, and to the extent that, it was, is or will be affected by people with anti-anafactive intentions, or whose actions have or did have unnanaic effects on balance. Where it is necessary to restore an equilibrium, or to create a harmony which never existed before, this will indeed also involve people's own bodies and other purely material things. Yet, unlike neutrality and nanaicity, anafaction does not concern matter as matter. In the strict sense the neutrality of the norm of neutrality denotes for persons only the neutralities of aspects with respect to which persons are catenal (not their bodies or other nonpersonal primary things). The material and natural world has its own nanaic forces, and people as people are no part of it. It is only when they have transgressed against neutrality or nanaicity in their bodies, or in other material things, with the intention to do so (or with the knowledge that they did so and could prevent it) that they will have to restore their bodily or material neutrality, or that they will have to take nanaic action with regard to these material bodies.

In itself there is nothing 'wrong' in the sense of anti-anafactive with moving about, for instance, as a result of bodily needs, or as a result of an anafactive operation. What would be wrong is that movement, or the highest speed possible, became a goal in itself of the person concerned. The movement or speed of the body is then the result of a person choosing an unneutral ultimate goal. We all know that bodies, whether in a neutral state or not, do not choose unneutral goals.

Similarly, in itself it is neither anafactive nor anti-anafactive to fall in love with somebody, or to be disgusted by somebody, at least if, and insofar as, this attraction or this repulsion are purely given and not the result of anti-anafactive considerations or practises. As a decision-maker a person does not decide to fall in love or to be disgusted; these are things which happen to 'im. Also 'er body does not decide to be attracted or to be repelled. What is, or would be, anti-anafactive for a person as a decision-maker is to choose love or hatred as ultimate ends per se, or to have other people's well-being depend on 'er own partial feelings of liking and disliking.

©MVVM, 41-56 ASWW

Model of Neutral-Inclusivity
Book of Fundamentals
The Norm of Neutrality
On Neutral Terms