2.5.2 |
PRIMACY- AND PRINCIPLE-RELATED |
If denominationalism is not used in the sense of
(adherence to a)
comprehensive ideology but in
an unfavorable sense, it is a synonym of denominational
exclusivism (X.313). The three main criterions to differentiate
the types of denominational exclusivism are the same ones as the main
criterions to differentiate the types of
denominational doctrine.
They relate to questions of (1) primacy, (2) principle
and (3) principalship.
The first criterion, that of primacy, has not yet been
mentioned at all, and its proper treatment has to be
postponed until
a later chapter.
It applies to a fundamental
choice which every denominational doctrine, or everyone choosing
such a doctrine, has to make: the choice between (a) the belief
that a universal norm or norms did, do and will exist independently
of their being propagated by some authority, and (b) the
belief that it is some authority who made or makes the universal
norm(s).
In other words: do
i believe in the right
norm(s), or do i trust in an authority because i believe that
'e has chosen
the right norm(s) versus are norms right because an
authority i trust in has chosen and recommended them, or recommends them.
Those who opt for the first alternative implicitly or explicitly
give primacy to the normative; those who opt for the second
one give primacy to the authoritative. As we will see,
denominationalists of the former persuasion can be called
"normists", whereas those of the latter persuasion are
'theocentrists'.
The second criterion, that of principle, is easier to
explain.
It relates to the principle(s) or kind of
principle(s)
which a particular denominational doctrine embraces or violates,
whether under the (belief in the) primacy of the normative, or
under the (belief in the) primacy of the authoritative.
To typify our own denominational doctrine as "an
inclusivistic one"
is to use a criterion of principle, the principle being that of
discriminational relevance interpreted in a
neutralistic way.
The third criterion, that of principalship, has to do with
the principal being(s) playing a role in a particular
comprehensive ideology.
If such an ideology starts from the primacy of
the authoritative, it must have at least one principal being,
namely the authority on whose will and decisions the rightness
of norms is believed to depend. Thus the belief in the primacy
of the authoritative implies a belief in principalship if
someone does adhere to a denominational doctrine at all. (If
someone believes in the primacy of the authoritative, but does
not 'see' any god or other authority, it will lead to
nondenominationalism.) Conversely, the belief in principalship does
not imply that one believes, or has to believe, in the primacy of
the authoritative. That is why principalship is another criterion
than primacy.
We will discuss denominational exclusivism which is somehow related to
principalship in
the next section.
The
disjunctive manifestations of
primacy-related (person-centered) denominational exclusivism
(X.1252) are theocentrist- and normist-person-centered exclusivism
(X.1252.14 & 15). These manifestations are disjunctive instead of
lateral, because
one cannot consistently believe in the primacy of both the normative
and the authoritative at the same time. (Someone may be
so inconsistent as to believe in the primacy of the normative
with respect to one principle and that of the authoritative with
respect to another, but then it does not make sense to classify the
exism as "primacy-related".) An ancient
form of
external
abnegational normist-person-centered
exclusivism is the description of normists who do not believe in the
authority of any god or someone's own god as "atheists",
in a derogatory way.
Judging atheist by its literal meaning, however, the
exism is rather a form of principalship-related denominationalism.
But then, of course, all these types of denominational
exclusivism are too closely connected to be treated differently
by the biased believer.
'Er Authority, Law and Principal
Being are a sacred trinity that is certainly not meant to be taken
apart.
As regards principle-related (person-centered) denominational
exclusivism (X.1253) we will only consider one principle and
unitary manifestation of it. The
principle is truth, and the
criterion not so much whether truth is recognized or not
(because every ideology does this in name), but the way in
which it is interpreted. In the denominational field this underlies
the distinction between supernaturalist or religious and
nonsupernaturalist or nonreligious doctrines. (On our model
supernaturalism is a denominational violation of the principle
of truth, but for the purpose of this classification it suffices
to speak of a different interpretation of this principle.)
When truth or supernaturalism is the principle, principle-related
denominationalism is religiousness-related (person-centered)
denominational exclusivism (X.2507). The disjunctive manifestations
of this unitary exism are religion-related (person-centered)
exclusivism (X.2507.14) and irreligious-person-centered
exclusivism (X.2507.15). We say "religion-related"
because religious-person-centered exclusivism (X.2507.28) has
still to be distinguished from religion-based (person-centered)
exclusivism (X.2507.29). Religious-person-centered refers to
the distinction between religious and irreligious people, whereas
religion-based refers to the distinction between (people
of) the one religion and (of) the other. 'Religionism' is
aggrandizemental religion-related
exclusivism, whether
religious-person-centered or religion-based. (Hence, a 'religionist'
is not just someone adhering to a religion but someone discriminating
on the basis of adherence to religion, or to a particular
religion.) As is generally the case with disjunctive manifestations
of the same type, the aggrandizemental component of the
one corresponds de facto to the abnegational component of the
other. Thus aggrandizemental religious-person-centered exclusivism
or religious exclusivism (X.2507.28.2), that is, exism re
religious people who are believed or felt to be superior or good
on the whole corresponds to abnegational irreligious-person-centered
exclusivism (X.2507.15.3), that is, exism re non- or
irreligious people who are believed or felt to be inferior, if
not wicked. (Irreligious may be used instead of nonreligious
here because it is now subject to an exclusivist attitude or
practise.)
Similarly, aggrandizemental irreligious-person-centered
exclusivism or irreligious exclusivism (X.2507.15.2), that
is, exism re irreligious people who are believed to be superior
or good on the whole corresponds to abnegational
religious-person-centered exclusivism (X.2507.28.3).
Altho
we believe that supernaturalism is a violation of the
principle of truth and that the human mind should therefore be
purged of it, it is religious belief itself which must be
considered normatively inferior because of its being supernaturalistic.
This religious belief should not be confused,
however, with the religious person adhering to such a belief:
'e may even be normatively superior because of 'er good conduct
in other respects. And if 'e is not, it is 'er
right of personhood to have
religious convictions. Should a religious
person voluntarily ask to be exorcized
'imself of spiritual
ideas which are inconsistent or too implausible to be true, or
to have remained true, we may assist 'im. Yet, we must not force
such an operation on 'im. In the event that these spiritual
ideas are, and remain, the evil cause of 'er own infringements
of other people's rights of personhood, there are always
suitable measures which can be taken. (Unlike certain sacred
books of religious or monotheist ideology, none of the books of
this Model calls for the wholesale
slaughter of denominational opponents, neither literally nor
figuratively.)
The encroachment by religious people upon the moral rights of
personhood of other religious and of nonreligious people, especially
in countries where the majority of the citizens were, or
still are, religious, is an
affirmative manifestation of
active self-aggrandizing religionism.
The gravest and bloodiest examples of this religionism have been the civil
and international wars between people or nations fighting in the name of a
different god, or in the name of the same god, but in the service of
different socioeconomic and national interests.
This religion-based
exclusivism, however, is only one aspect of religion-related
exism. Warfare amongst religious believers themselves may be a serious
affirmative manifestation of it, yet we must not forget the
intermediary manifestations which
prepare those believers for such affirmative actions.
An intermediary manifestation of religious-person-centered
exism is the employment and propagation of religious symbols by
the state (whether or not in connection with religious feasts).
The evaluative opposite of this
emblematic manifestation and of
all similar, nonemblematic manifestations of religionism is
abnegational religious-person-centered exism, which involves the
encroachment by nonreligious people upon the moral rights of
personhood of religious people. What it does not involve,
however, is the nonuse of religious symbols by the state even
tho religious
fanatics have but too often claimed that such
nonuse would be antireligious. Time and again these unteachable
out-and-outers have to be told that the state has to represent
citizens of all denominations, and citizens of no denomination,
by not exclusively associating itself with the denominational
belief of any group in particular. When governments that do not
allow the display of religious emblems in public buildings
and during state ceremonies display the emblems of a party-political
ideology instead, this is in itself not abnegational
religious-person-centered exism, but a brand of
politico-ideological exclusivism.
Such is no better nor worse than religionism.
